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A2 Revision – Imperfect Competition AR, MR and TR curves

November 13, 2017 Leave a comment

fig08-11You should note the following from the graphs:
• to sell an additional unit of a commodity, the monopolist must reduce the price of all units sold. This therefore means the AR curves falls.
• as the price on all units must be lowered to sell the higher output, MR is lower than the price of the marginal unit(AR)
• TR at first increases with output but as price is reduced to sell more goods and services, eventually falls.
• where MR = 0 TR is at a maximum.

A2 Revision – Oligopoly and the kinked demand curve – download

October 25, 2017 Leave a comment

With the A2 Essay paper next week I thought something on the kinked demand curve might be useful. I alluded to in a previous post that one model of oligopoly revolves around how a firm perceives its demand curve. The model relates to an oligopoly in which firms try to anticipate the reactions of rivals to their actions. As the firm cannot readily observe its demand curve with any degree of certainty, it has got to estimate how consumers will react to price changes.

In the graph below the price is set at P1 and it is selling Q1. The firm has to decide whether to alter the price. It knows that the degree of its price change will depend upon whether or not the other firms in the market will follow its lead. The graph shows the the two extremes for the demand curve which the firm perceives that it faces. Suppose that an oligopolist, for whatever reason, produces at output Q1 and price P1, determined by point X on the graph. The firm perceives that demand will be relatively elastic in response to an increase in price, because they expects its rivals to react to the price rise by keeping their prices stable, thereby gaining customers at the firm’s expense. Conversely, the oligopolist expects rivals to react to a decrease in price by cutting their prices by an equivalent amount; the firm therefore expects demand to be relatively inelastic in response to a price fall, since it cannot hope to lure many customers away from their rivals. In other words, the oligopolist’s initial position is at the junction of the two demand curves of different relative elasticity, each reflecting a different assumption about how the rivals are expected to react to a change in price. If the firm’s expectations are correct, sales revenue will be lost whether the price is raised or cut. The best policy may be to leave the price unchanged.

With this price rigidity a discontinuity exists along a vertical line above output Q1 between the two marginal revenue curves associated with the relatively elastic and inelastic demand curves. Costs can rise or fall within a certain range without causing a profit-maximising oligopolist to change either the price or output. At output Q1 and price P1 MC=MR as long as the MC curve is between an upper limit of MC2 and a lower limit of MC1.

Criticisms of the kinked demand curve theory.
Although it is a plausible explanation of price rigidity it doesn’t explain how and why an oligopolist chooses to be a point X in the first place. Research casts doubt on whether oligopolists respond to price changes in the manner assumed. Oligopolistic markets often display evidence of price leadership, which provides an alternative explanation of orderly price behaviour. Firms come to the conclusion that price-cutting is self-defeating and decide that it may be advantageous to follow the firm which takes the first steps in raising the price. If all firms follow, the price rise will be sustained to the benefit of all firms.

If you want to gradually build the kinked demand curve model download the powerpoint by clicking below.
Oligopoly

A2 Revision – Monopoly and Deadweight Loss

September 26, 2017 Leave a comment

A topic in the A2 syllabus is Market Failure with special emphasis on Monopoly and Deadweight Loss.

In Perfect Competition we stated that the force of supply and demand establish an equilibrium situation in which resources are used most efficiently – MC (Supply) = AR(Demand) . Furthermore, in perfect competition the firm produces at MC = MR (profit max) which is also the same as producing at MC = AR (allocative efficiency). This is because AR and MR are the same in perfect competition. Therefore the same output represents allocative efficiency and profit max. Remember that long-run Perfect Competition is a significant output as it is where:
MC = MR – Maximum Profit or Minimum Loss
MC = AR – Allocative Efficiency (Supply = Demand)
AC = MC – Technical Optimum – Productive Efficiency

However for a monopolist because the AR and the MR curves are different we get separate outputs for Allocative Efficiency and Profit Max. The graph below shows that at profit maximising equilibrium, output Q2 is less than that in a competitive market (Q1), and the demand and supply (MC) curves do not intersect. Q1 represents the Allocative Efficiency level of output and P1 the price. The shaded area therefore represents the loss of allocative efficiency or the deadweight loss.

A2 Revision – Perfect Competition and Shut-down, Breakeven Points

September 8, 2017 Leave a comment

I went through this graph with my A2 class. Note that the firm’s short-run supply curve starts at P4. Useful for multiple-choice questions.

Short run supply

Teaching MC=MR with M&M’s

August 15, 2017 1 comment

Having just completed Perfect and Imperfect Competition with my Year 13 class I used a couple of packets of M&M’s to drum home the concept of marginal analysis MC=MR. It has always been something that students have struggled with but I am hoping this experience of creating graphs with M&M’s might help their understanding and when to use the concept.

Profit is maximised at the rate of output where the positive difference between total revenues and total costs is the greatest. Using marginal analysis, the firm will produce at a rate of output where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Below are a few of the graphs done using M&M’s.
MM1MM3MM4.jpegMM2

 

Tacit Collusion at Martha’s Vineyard petrol stations.

July 16, 2017 Leave a comment

The Economist ‘Free Exchange’ had an article about tacit collusion and the role of algorithms in setting prices. Martha’s Vineyard, a popular holiday retreat for the wealthy in the US, has four petrol stations who had a price-fixing suit brought against them for what was seen as extremely high petrol prices when compared to those at nearby Cape Cod. The judges found no evidence that there was agreement between petrol stations to raise prices although they did note that the market encouraged tacit (silent) collusion amongst the four petrol stations. Whereas explicit collusion over prices is illegal, tacit collusion is not. The conditions conducive for tacit collusion include:

  1. The market is concentrated and there are strong barriers to entry from competitors. Martha’s Vineyard is cut off from the mainland.
  2. Prices are transparent in a way that renders any attempt to steal business by lowering prices self-defeating. A price cut posted outside one petrol station will soon be matched by the others. And if one station raises prices, it can always cut them again if the others do not follow.
  3. The product is a small-ticket and frequent purchase, such as petrol. Markets for such items are especially prone to tacit collusion, because the potential profits from “cheating” on an unspoken deal, before others can respond, are small.

Petrol Price App

Although the consumer maybe able to find out the price of petrol at various stations through a smartphone app but this app makes it easier for the petrol stations to monitor and match each others’ prices. A retailer would have little incentive to cut prices and as other competitors would be able to match their prices instantly leaving everyone worse off.

Collusion in oligopoly

It is often observed that oligopolistic firms are torn between two conflicting desires: The wish to compete on one hand, and the wish to collude on the other. The hope of winning any price war tempts some firms (particularly those with significant advantages, such as lower costs) but collusion is an attractive proposition given the desire to remove the uncomfortable uncertainty that interdependence brings to the market. Collusion reduces the fear of competitive price cutting or retaliatory advertising which could reduce industry profits.

Where oligopolists agree formally or informally to limit competition between themselves they may set output quotas, fix prices, or limit product promotion or development.

A formal collusive agreement is called a cartel. A cartel can achieve the same profits as if the industry were a monopoly. In the graph below the total market or industry demand curve is shown as D and the corresponding marginal revenue curve is MR. The cartel’s marginal cost curve (MC) is the horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves of the members of the cartel. The cartel will set a price of p1 (MC = MR) where profits are maximised. Alternatively the cartel could set output at q1 by giving each cartel member an output quota. This would produce the same price (p1).

By contrast, p2 shows the marginal cost price which would be the price under perfect competition, with q2 showing the corresponding output. This means that the cartel will operate with a higher price and lower output when compared to perfect competition.

Cartel with Monop Price

Cartel with a monopoly price

Covert (formal) collusion occurs where firms meet secretly and make decisions about prices or output. Tacit (informal) collusion is much more difficult to control. This is when firms act as if they have agreements in place without actually having communicated with each other.

Collusion between firms whether formal or informal is more likely when:

• there are only a few firms in the industry, so reaching an agreement is easier and any cheating can be spotted quickly.

• they have similar costs of production and methods of production making any agreement on price easier to reach.

• the firms produce similar products. Cartels have been common in industries such as cement production in recent years.

• the products have price inelastic demand meaning that a rise in price by the cartel will lead to a rise in sales revenue for the firms.

• the laws against collusion in a country are weak or ineffective.

Collusive agreements often prove difficult to sustain. Most are illegal as they raise prices to the detriment of the consumer. They cannot, therefore, be enforced by contract, even if cheating could be detected. Each and every party to the collusive agreement has an incentive to cheat by producing more than agreed. This will suppress price slightly, but the firm can still take advantage of artificially high prices as long as the other firms do not cheat as well. However, stable market conditions (a small number of firms; similar costs of production; similar products; high barriers to entry; easy detection of cheating on the agreement) make joint profit maximisation feasible.

Sunk Costs, Market Structure and Football Clubs

January 19, 2017 Leave a comment

Over the holidays I read Stefan Szymanski’s book “Money and Football – A Soccernomics Guide”. Szymanski also co-authored “Soccernomics” with Simon Kuper. There were various references to economic theory through the book which I will refer to on this blog.

Market Dominance

Dominance in a market is often associated with the lack of competition whether it be due to monopoly power, predatory pricing, the scale of investment etc. However this is not the case when it comes to football. Szymanski mentions the fact that there are 27 professional teams withn a 50 mile radius of Manchester Utd. If fans don’t like United, there are plenty of alternatives as there are in Madrid which has 5 professional clubs. In some countries football rivals play in the same stadium:

  • In Germany: Bayern Munich and TSV 1860 Munich,
  • In Italy: Inter Milan and AC Milan,
  • In Switzerland: FC Zurich and FC Grasshopper
  • In Brazil: Botafogo, Flamengo and Fluminense

Football Clubs.jpgDominance in markets usually occurs because of the initial investment required to compete in the first place – set-up costs. If you look at the railway industry (which could be said to be a natural monopoly) the cost of putting down new train tracks by the existing ones or a new line would be excessive and the ability to cover these costs would very difficult. Any benefit that may arise from competition would be diminished by the cost of duplication.

Dominance is easy to explain if there are very large set-up costs, which, once spent, cannot be recovered other than by operating in the industry. Economist refers to these costs as Sunk Costs.

Dominance in a market can also occur in markets where there are less sunk costs. Take for instance the soft drinks industry as an example. It remains relatively inexpensive to set-up a production plant to bottle soft drinks but Coca-Cola dominates the world market with 42% market share, followed by Pepsi with 28%. Their dominance is through advertising which makes up the majority of the sunk costs. Advertising is an example of ‘endogenous’ sunk costs which are determined by the firm as opposed to ‘exogenous’ sunk costs which are determined by technological requirements.
Premier League Players.jpgIn professional football the focus is on player investment rather than advertising, where the big clubs are those that spend heavily on players and win league championships. Teams that win are more likely to attract a larger fan base and greater revenue. Szymanski states that the big difference between football and soft drinks is that the pattern of dominance looks the same in small markets. For instance clubs in the English Division 2 (Division 4 in the old days) still stay in existence mainly because they operate in a different market than the Premiership teams. Of the 88 clubs in the English Football League in 1923, 85 still exist, and most of them still play in the 4 English Divisions. Also those clubs in the lower Division do benefit from intense local loyalty especially through tough times with performance. When clubs get relegated to the Championship from the Premier League, although they lose revenue from TV rights their fan base remains fairly constant. However a lot of these clubs will find it hard breaking into the dominant group – Manchester City, Manchester Utd, Liverpool, Arsenal, Chelsea, Spurs – unless they receive significant funding from an investor who doesn’t expect to see a financial return or have an exceptional season without high profile players like Leicester City who won the Premiership in 2015/16.

Unlike most business in which loss-making firms shut down or merge into other businesses, football clubs almost always survive. This does not prevent dominance, but unlike most industries, it does mean that the pattern of dominance tends to look the same everywhere. Source: Szymanski

Monopsony v Monopoly – Tesco v Unilever

October 17, 2016 Leave a comment

Geoff Riley did a very good post on Tutor2u that outlined the recent dispute between Tesco and Unilever. Marmite, PG Tips tea and Pot Noodles are among dozens of brands currently unavailable on Tesco’s online site due to this dispute with Unilever. Unilever raised its price by 10% in the UK to compensate for the sharp drop in the pound’s value.

Tesco is resisting the move and has removed Unilever products from its website. Unilever see the price increase as a  “normal” reaction to shifts in currency values – since the Brexit vote there has been a 17% decrease in the value of the pound which has added to the cost of importing goods. The products currently absent from Tesco’s website also include Comfort fabric conditioner, Hellmann’s mayonnaise and Ben & Jerry’s ice cream. With the A2 exam looming here are some notes on Monopoly and Monopsony.

Monopoly and Monopsony theory

Monopoly. Perfect competition is not to be found in the real world and absolute or pure monopoly is also virtually impossible to achieve since it applies operating in the absence of competition (i.e. no substitutes). While it is not difficult for a firm to become a sole supplier it is extremely difficult to achieve a situation where there are no substitutes for the product. A more realistic definition of monopoly would be ‘a sole supplier of a commodity for which there are no good substitutes’. In fact the degree of monopoly power in the real world tends to be judged on the basis of the share of the total market accounted for by any particular supplier.

The graph below shows that at profit maximising equilibrium, output Qm is less than that in a competitive market (Qe), and the demand and supply (MC) curves do not intersect. Qe represents the Allocative Efficiency level of output and Pe the price. The shaded area therefore represents the loss of allocative efficiency or the deadweight loss.

monopoly-dwl 

Therefore monopolists restrict output and mis-allocate resources leading to a deadweight loss to the economy. However the government, using price controls, can force a shift from the preferred monopoly equilibrium (MC=MR) to one equivalent to the perfectly competitive equilibrium (MC=AR). At the less-preferred equilibrium, a monopolist’s supernormal profit may be either reduced or turned into a subnormal profit. In the latter case, a permanent subsidy may be necessary to keep the firm in business.

Monopsony. Two areas are worthy of mention, including the monopsony power of the large supermarkets (as stated above), who can dictate terms to smaller suppliers, and the monopsony power associated with buyers of labour in the labour market.

A monopsony occurs in the labour market when there is a single or dominant buyer of labour. The buyer therefore is able to determine the price at which is paid for services. Unlike other examples we have looked at, in this situation we are now dealing with an imperfect rather than a perfectly competitive market. The monopsonist will hire workers where:

monopsony-labour

Marginal Cost of labour (MCL) = Marginal Revenue product of labour (MRPL)

You will remember from the notes on the Perfect Labour Market that this is known as the profit maximising position.

From the perspective of the monopsonist firm facing the supply curve directly, if at any point it wants to hire more labour, it has to offer a higher wage to encourage more workers to join the market – after all, this is what the ACL curve tells it. However, the firm would then have to pay that higher wage to all its workers so the marginal cost of hiring the extra worker is not just the wage paid to that worker, but the increased wage paid to all workers as well. So the marginal cost of labour curve (MCL) can be added to the diagram.

If the monopsonist firm wants to maximise profit, it will hire labour up to the point where the marginal cost of labour is equal to the marginal revenue product of labour. Therefore it will use labour up to level of Eq which is where MCL=MRPL. In order to entice workers to supply this amount of labour, the firm need pay only the wage Wq. (Remember that ACL is the supply of labour). You can see, therefore, that a profit-maximising monopsonist will use less labour, and pay a lower wage, than a firm operating under perfect competition.

In this situation the power of the employer in the labour market is of overriding importance and the employer can set a low wage because of this buying power.

A2 Economics Revision: Contestable Markets

October 5, 2016 Leave a comment

Contest MarketsIn the A2 course contestable markets is a popular essay question and is usually combined with another market structure.

What is a contestable market?

• One in which there is one firm (or a small number of firms)
• Because of freedom of entry and exit, the firm faces competition and might operate in a way similar to a perfectly competitive firm
• The threat of “hit and run entry” from new firms may be sufficient to keep the industry operating at a competitive price and output
• The key requirement for a contestable market is the absence of sunk costs – i.e. costs that cannot be recovered if a business decides to leave a market
• When sunk costs are high, a market is more likely to produce an price and output similar to monopoly (with the risk of allocative inefficiency and loss of economic welfare)
• A perfectly contestable market occurs only when entry and exit into and out of a market is perfectly costless
• Contestable markets are different from perfect competitive markets
• It is possible for one incumbent firm to dominate the industry
• Each existing firm in the market produces a differentiated product (i.e. goods and services are not perfect substitutes for each other)

There are 3 conditions for market contestability:

• Perfect information and the ability and or legal right to use the best available technology
• Freedom to market / advertise and enter a market
• The absence of sunk costs

Example
• Liberalisation of the European Airline Market in late 1990s
• Traditional “flag-flying” airlines faced new competition
• Barriers to entry in the industry were lowered (including greater use of leased aircraft)
• New Entrants – easyJet- Ryanair

Sunglasses – a true monopoly.

August 17, 2016 Leave a comment

With summer approaching in the southern hemisphere and the days getting brighter you will be looking to don sunglasses on a more regular basis. Sunglasses come in various styles and brands, eg. Rayban, Oakley, Gucci, Prada, Versace to name but a few,  but can be quite expensive when you consider the so-called competition that is in the market which in theory should driving down the price. Sunglasses these days are reasonably homogeneous in that the frames and materials are very similar and it surprised me that 80% of the major sunglass brands are controlled by Luxottica, in a market that is worth US$28 billion.

Luxottica produced the following brands of sunglasses under their name:

Prada, Chanel, Dolce & Gabbana, Versace, Burberry, Ralph Lauren, Tiffany, Bulgari, Vogue, Persol, Coach, DKNY, Rayban, Oakley, Sunglasses Hut, LensCrafters, Oliver Peoples, Pearle Vision, Target Optical and Sears Optical.

This list of brands is fairly comprehensive and by controlling 80% of the market you have a monopoly and dictate the price consumers have to pay for each specific brand since the industry isn’t competitive. Therefore they are Price Makers. But Luxottica also dictate what goes in the shops as they own Sunglass hut, Oliver peoples and Pearle Vision where consumers shop for sunglasses. This makes it very difficult for a brand outside one that is produced by Luxottica to compete as you can’t get your product into those shops. So not only do they have a monopoly in the production but they also control the distribution of sunglasses. See monopoly graph below.

Monopoly

In the clip below from ’60 Minutes’ they mention Oakley’s dilemma when their sunglasses became more popular than those produced by Luxottica. When this happen Luxottica proceeded to hold fewer Oakely sunglasses in their Sunglass Hut shops causing Oakley’s stock to plunge. Then in 2007 Oakley was left with no choice but to merge with Luxottica.

 

 

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Ludicrous regulations of the US Airline Industry and Contestable Markets

August 12, 2016 1 comment

We discussed Contestable Markets in my A2 class today and I used this clip from Commanding Heights to show how regulated the US airline industry was during the 1970’s. Regulations meant that major carriers like Pan Am never had to compete with newcomers. However an Englishman named Freddie Laker was determined to break this tradition and set-up Laker airways to compete on trans-atlantic flights. He offered flights at less than half the price of what Pan Am charged. Alfred Kahn was given the task by the then President Jimmy Carter to breakup the Civil Aeronautics Board (the regulatory body) and he wanted a leaner regulatory environment in which the market was free to dictate price. There is a piece in the clip that shows how ludicrous some of the regulations were:

When I got to the Civil Aeronauts Board, the biggest division under me was the division of enforcement – in effect, FBI agents who would go around and seek out secret discounts and then impose fines. We would discipline them. It was illegal to compete in price. That means it was illegal to compete in the discounts you offer travel agents. So we regulated travel agents’ discounts. Internationally, since they couldn’t cut rates, they competed by having more and more sumptuous meals. We actually regulated the size of sandwiches. Alfred Kahn

When the CAB was closed down competition was the rule and the industry had vastly underestimated the demand for air travel at lower prices – a very elastic demand curve – see graph below.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

In the A2 course contestable markets is a popular essay question and is usually combined with another market structure.

What is a contestable market?

• One in which there is one firm (or a small number of firms)
• Because of freedom of entry and exit, the firm faces competition and might operate in a way similar to a perfectly competitive firm
• The threat of “hit and run entry” from new firms may be sufficient to keep the industry operating at a competitive price and output
• The key requirement for a contestable market is the absence of sunk costs – i.e. costs that cannot be recovered if a business decides to leave a market
• When sunk costs are high, a market is more likely to produce an price and output similar to monopoly (with the risk of allocative inefficiency and loss of economic welfare)
• A perfectly contestable market occurs only when entry and exit into and out of a market is perfectly costless
• Contestable markets are different from perfect competitive markets
• It is possible for one incumbent firm to dominate the industry
• Each existing firm in the market produces a differentiated product (i.e. goods and services are not perfect substitutes for each other)

There are 3 conditions for market contestability:

• Perfect information and the ability and or legal right to use the best available technology
• Freedom to market / advertise and enter a market
• The absence of sunk costs

Example
• Liberalisation of the US Airline Industry in the 1970’s and the European Airline Market in late 1990s
• Traditional “flag-flying” airlines faced new competition
• Barriers to entry in the industry were lowered (including greater use of leased aircraft)
• New Entrants – easyJet- Ryanair

A2 Economics -Imperfect Competition with M&M’s

August 4, 2016 Leave a comment

Not to be outdone by my previous post, colleague Warren Baas had his A2 class use M&M’s to construct Imperfect Competition graphs. See the selection below – subnormal profit and normal profit.

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A2 Economics – Teaching MC=MR with M&M’s

August 4, 2016 Leave a comment

Having just completed Perfect Competition with my A2 class I used a couple of packets of M&M’s to drum home the concept of marginal analysis MC=MR. It has always been something that students have struggled with but I am hoping this experience of creating graphs with M&M’s might help their understanding and when to use the concept.

Profit is maximised at the rate of output where the positive difference between total revenues and total costs is the greatest. Using marginal analysis, the perfectly competitive firm will produce at a rate of output where marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Marginal revenue, however, is equal to price. Therefore, the perfectly competitive firm produces at an output rate where marginal cost equals the price of output. Remember that the firm will make profits as long as the extra revenue brought in from selling the last unit of output(MR) is greater than the extra cost which is incurred in producing it(MC). Below are some of the graphs they created – perfect competition normal profit, subnormal profit, supernormal profit and the firm and the market for long-run perfect competition.
MM1 MMs2MM2 MM3

 

A2 Revision: Monopolistic Competition Long-Run

May 15, 2016 Leave a comment

Monopolistic LRHere is a quick revision note on monopolistic competition. This is a market structure in which there are a large number of firms selling commodities which are very close substitutes. There are weak barriers to entry and firms may enter the industry with ease. Notice on the diagram that the firm initially makes supernormal profit at Q0 – at MC=MR Price = P0 and Cost = AC0. However with weak barriers to entry these profits are competed away and they now produce at Q1 where at MC=MR and the Price and Cost = AC1

Modern capitalism is characterised by a large number of ‘limited’ monopolies. They are sole suppliers of branded goods, but other firms compete with them by selling similar goods with different brand names. This is the market structure described as monopolistic competition. Thus the commodities produced by any one industry are not homogeneous; the goods are differentiated by branding and the use of trade marks. The individual firm has a monopoly position, but it faces keen competition from firms supplying very similar goods. It has, therefore, only a limited degree of monopoly power – how much depends upon the extent to which firms are free to enter the industry. Product differentiation is emphasised (some would say, created) by the practice of competitive advertising which is, perhaps, the most striking feature of monopolistic competition.

Advertising is employed to heighten in the consumer’s mind the differences between Brand X and Brand Y. It is important to realise that we are concerned with the differentiation of goods in the economic sense and not in the technical sense. Two branded products may be almost identical in their technical features or chemical composition, but if advertising and other selling practices have created different images in the consumer’s mind, then these products are different from our point of view because the consumer will be prepared to pay different prices for them.

European Farmers expanding output

April 3, 2016 Leave a comment

Living in a rural area you tend to get a lot of free newspapers with a agricultural bent. Skimming the pages of NZ Farmer (March 28 2016) I came across a very informative article by Keith Woodford about European farmers expanding their value-add dairy production and its impact on New Zealand.

Up toCAP Int Price April 2015 European farmers were protected by production quotas and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which provided large production subsidies which led to over-production. At the outset of the EU, one of the main objectives was the system of intervention in agricultural markets and protection of the farming sector.

An intervention price is the price at which the CAP would be ready to come into the market and to buy the surpluses, thus preventing the price from falling below the intervention price. This is illustrated opposite. Here the European supply of lamb drives the price down to the equilibrium 0Pfm – the free market price, where supply and demand curves intersect and quantity demanded and quantity supplied equal 0Qm. However, the intervention price (0Pint) is located above the equilibrium and it has the following effects:

1. It encourages an increase in European production. Consequently, output is raised to 0Qs1.

2. At intervention price, there is a production surplus equal to the horizontal distance AB which is the excess of supply above demand at the intervention price.

3. In buying the surplus, the intervention agency incurs costs equal to the area ABCD. It will then incur the cost of storing the surplus or of destroying it.

4. There is a contraction in domestic consumption to 0Qd1

Consumers pay a higher price to the extent that the intervention price exceeds the notional free market price.

Production quotas in Europe were eliminated in April 2015 and from April to November European milk production increased by 4% with a 6% increase in December from the previous year. However, as with the reduction in subsidies in New Zealand in 1984, they will be a lot of pain for European farmers as their ‘safety net’ has now been taken away.

The Europeans are producing as much cheese, butter, infant formula and cream as they can, with cheese being more important than liquid milk.  The Europeans are also selling increasing quantities of UHT and infant formula to China.  With both products, they are out-marketing New Zealand.

Chinese infant formula statistics for 2015 show European countries with 78 per cent market share of imported product, compared to New Zealand at 8 per cent.

#1 – Holland – 34%

#2 – Ireland – 15%

The Europeans would like to decrease their production skim milk powder (SMP), but with butter and cream being profitable, they keep producing the SMP as a by-product.   However, the European production of whole milk powder (WMP) has been drifting down in response to low prices.

The European producers have protection from some of the Global Dairy Auction process through their reliance on value-add products.  Also, apart from Ireland, all European dairy systems are 12-month-a-year production systems.  These 12 month production systems can lead to higher production costs, but they also lead to lower processing costs through better utilisation of processing infrastructure. This then feeds back into higher farm-gate prices.

Buffer Stocks

The Europeans have been putting limited quantities of skim milk powder (SMP) into what are called intervention stocks. At the end of January 2016, there were about 50,000 tonnes of SMP in a public intervention store. The intervention quantities could reach a new limit of 218,000 tonnes over coming months. The main benefit of the SMP intervention is a smoothing of commodity prices. So if the price is too high stocks are released into the market and when they are too low authorities buy stock in order to reduce supply and therefore increase the price to a specific level.

European Farmers and the future

There is a good chance that in the longer term European milk production will further increase, as some farms become bigger and fewer in number.  Poland has become one of the largest milk producers in the EU become a major milk producer with its flat terrain, very fertile soil, low feed and labour costs. Furthermore compared to other EU members it doesn’t have the pressure on land for residential use. Since joining the EU in 2004, the informal dairy sector is also still considerable in Poland, but the 2015 quota lift has seen these farms absorbed into the formal sector which in turn are expected to expand quickly without quota impediments.

Conclusion

For this longer term, the Europeans are not going to try and compete with New Zealand with WMP.  Europeans regard WMP as an outlet for product with no other immediate use. And they know that, in low-priced volatile commodity markets for long-life products, they lack competitive advantage relative to New Zealand. 

Low Cost Airline’s interesting measures to increase efficiency 

January 26, 2016 Leave a comment

What a difference a year makes for Indian low cost airline Spicejet. On the verge of shutting down in December 2014 with $300m of debt with suppliers refusing to refuel planes unless paid upfront and staff not been paid their monthly salaries, the airline has made a remarkable recovery. Today it is filling 93% of available seats and has made a profit in the last 4 quarters.

What has been the cause of the turnaround?

  • Aircraft fuel expenses dropped nearly 35 percent
  • Demand has increased – compared to the previous year Indian airlines carried 20% more passengers in 2015.
  • Negotiated better terms with aircraft-leasing firms
  • Cut jobs and managers pay
  • Scrapped unprofitable routes

SpicejetMeasures to reduce inefficiencies of Spicejet

  • Reducing the time to second-tier cities and thereby making it possible to fit in an extra flight a day.
  • Steel brakes on wheels of Boeing 737 were replaced with lighter carbon brakes
  • In-flight magazines reduced – less weight
  • Meals served in cardboard boxes instead of plastic trays – reducing fuel consumption
  • Planes were filled with just enough fuel within safety margin
  • Landing gear was deployed 8km from touchdown instead of 14km – reduce drag
  • Taxi on the runway using just one engine – more fuel efficient
  • Stocks of spares parts are now more readily available so planes spend less time on the ground

Although the airline still has a long way to go to reduce its debt its recent performance has enabled it to think about long-term expansion.

 

Maple syrup cartel under pressure

December 18, 2015 Leave a comment

FPAQThere is the oil cartel, OPEC, but little is written about FPAQ which is The Federation of Quebec Syrup Producers. The FPAQ was created in 1966 under the Professional Syndicates Act. Affiliated with Union des producteurs agricoles (UPA), it’s mission is to defend the economic, social, and moral interests of Quebec’s 13,500 maple syrup producers who operate 7,300 maple syrup businesses in 12 regional maple syrup producers’ unions. Each producer is subject to a quota and any excess syrup is put into FPAQ’s stockpile, and producers only get paid for it when it is sold which can be years later. Between 2010 and 2014 Quebec accounted for 72% of world production – see graph.

The FPAQ’s intention is to keep prices high and stable by limiting supply of syrup on the market. However there are concerns about FPAQ’s long-term viability:

  • As with the oil industry the higher price has encouraged other suppliers to entry the market.
  • Across the border the US has increased its maple harvest from 7.2m litres in 2012 to 12m liters in 2014. This may mean cuts in members’ quotas and stockpiling more syrup to maintain a higher price.
  • With maple syrup becoming increasingly expensive substitutes are being sought in the from of toppings made from corn syrup.
  • Supply is outpacing demand and FPAQ’s strategic reserve has increased to 25m litres which is equivalent to one year’s sales.

Saudi Arabia has been able to drive high-cost oil producers out of business by allowing the price of oil to fall. However the FPAQ don’t really have this option as the operating costs for maple syrup plantations are very low and US producers are unlikely to cease production like the high-cost oil producers.

A barrel of maple syrup from Quebec is worth more today than a barrel of crude oil. Producers are reaping the benefits, but not all agree with the tactics that whipped the supply chain into shape. Below is a very good video from The New York Times.

 

Categories: Market Structures Tags:

Chinese challenge Boeing and Airbus Duopoly but for what reason?

December 16, 2015 Leave a comment

C919 - COMACThe commercial aircraft market has been dominated by Boeing (USA) and Airbus (EU) and according to Airbus’ Global Market Forecast 2015, in the next 20 years, passenger air traffic will grow annually at 4.6 percent driving a need for around 32,600 new passenger and freighter aircrafts. This duopoly has existed since Airbus introduced its long-range A330/A340 in the 1990’s when it challenged Boeing’s monopoly position. However, the Chinese are now challenging the duopoly’s market share by introducing its alternative to the Boeing and Airbus options. COMAC, a Chinese state-owned planemaker, has revealed its C919 plane as a competitor to the Airbus 320 and Boeing’s 737 although the C919 will not be ready for service until 2019.

Eventhough COMAC is state backed there are still significant barriers to entry for the commercial airline manufacturer.

  • It is anticipated that the C919 fuel efficiency will not be a the levels of the newer versions of the Boeing 737 and Airbus A320.
  • The Chinese have little experience in creating complex production systems and supply chains. Boeing research and development costs for the new Dreamliner, grew to $28 billion as a result of problems with its supply chain.
  • They will need to improve their safety records in order to encourage sales. COMAC’s regional jet, the ARJ21, had its first test flight in 2008, but has yet to be certified because of poor wiring and cracks on the wings.

Are the Chinese actually trying to break the duopoly?

COMAC’s goal of breaking up the Boeing/Airbus narrow-body aircraft duopoly is a challenging ordeal but is this the motivation behind the C919? With China’s secret-capitalist economy, the central government likes to use American or European aircraft orders as a way of correcting a trade imbalance. Although they would still be importing the avionics and engines from around the world, the overall value of those components are insignificant when compared with a complete aircraft. China does need planes now and with the growing income levels of the economy there will be huge demand for air travel. But what is ironic is that Airbus already have a factory in Tianjin making the A320 aircraft although COMAC are realistic that new aircraft take significant time to put into service and therefore still require Airbus planes.

National Pride

China has established itself as a economic powerhouse but they also want to be seen as having the innovative ideas and technological knowledge to challenge the established market. By producing a state-of-the-art aircraft they can announce their arrival on the world stage of innovation. The C919 is a pathway to achieving this.

Categories: Market Structures Tags:

Consumer interface removing the supply chain

October 26, 2015 Leave a comment

HT to past student Shelalé Mazari for the image below. Tom Goodwin wrote a very interesting article on the battle for the consumer interface.

Uber, the world’s largest taxi company, owns no vehicles. Facebook, the world’s most popular media owner, creates no content. Alibaba, the most valuable retailer, has no inventory. And Airbnb, the world’s largest accommodation provider, owns no real estate. Something interesting is happening.

He states that since the Industrial Revolution there are complex supply chains including manufacturers – importers – wholesalers – franchises – retailers. However the rapid rise in technology has allowed a number of these parts of the chain to be removed.

Uber, Facebook, Alibaba and Airnb are companies with, what Goodwin refers to as, thin layers that sit on top of vast supply systems (where the costs are) and interface with a huge number of people (where the money is). The New York Times needs to write, fact check, buy paper, print and distribute newspapers to get their ad money.
Uber etc

A2 Revision – Price Discrimination

October 9, 2015 Leave a comment

Here is a great video from Tyler Cowen of Marginal Revolution fame in which he explains Price discrimination – Unit 2 in the CIE Economic syllabus. Price discrimination is common: movie theaters charge seniors less money than they charge young adults. Computer software companies sell to businesses and students at different rates, often offering discounts to students. These price differences reflect variations in the elasticity of demand for these different groups. When demand curves are different, it is more profitable to set different prices in different markets. We’ll also cover arbitrage and take a look at some examples of price discrimination in the airline industry

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