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Retail stores now target consumer body language.

August 12, 2017 Leave a comment

Keeping on the behavioral economics topic I was interested to read about shoppers emotions being used by retailers to try an increase sales. Companies now pay large sums of money for software that identifies the following:

  • shoppers’ movements
  • facial expression
  • dissatisfaction
  • surprise
  • eye-tracking
  • dilating pupils
  • thermal-imaging

Body language.pngSome research has shown that when a person who is smiling enters a shop they are on average likely to spend 30% more than others who are more neutral position in their emotion. Conventional research states that when people are interviewed or fill in surveys they tend to edit their responses to make them sound like a ‘rational person’. However a lot of purchases are driven by the subconscious emotions. There are various companies out there today that are trying to get in the mind of consumers namely:

We have all heard of retail therapy which involves people going on a spending spree when they tend to be feeling down. The challenge for all the companies out there is to spot when a person is in this state when they enter their shop. The key to it is tracking the unconscious mind in shoppers.

Try this exercise with your class and see how many stages they can get through. If we make persistent errors in things we are very good at like colours how likely is it that we are also subject to persistent, predictable errors in areas of consumer decision-making?

Categories: Behavioural Economics

More loss aversion in male tennis players when behind.

August 4, 2017 Leave a comment

A paper entitiled ‘Is Roger Federer more loss averse than Serena Williams?’published by By Nejat Anbarci, K. Peren Arin, Cagla Okten and Christina Zenker on tennis serving and loss aversion caught my attention. The paper found that:

Roger_Federer.jpg
1 a server will put more effort into his/her serve speed when behind in score than when ahead in score,
2 players’ effort levels and thus serve speeds get less sensitive to losses or gains
when score difference gets too large,
3 A female player, on the other hand, does not change her serve speed and thus her effort when behind compared to when the score is tied, while she serves slower when ahead than when the score is tied.
4. Overall servers will be more risk averse in the domain of gains than in the domain of losses.
Researchers used serve speed at different points of matches in the high-stakes, professional Dubai Tennis Tournament to test their theoretical predictions and whether overall players exhibited the fundamental bias of loss aversion.

 

Loss Aversion and the  Endowment Effect

Loss aversion can be explained by prospect theory, which states that an individual’s value function (whether for money or otherwise) is concave for gains but convex for losses. In other words, people are more sensitive to losses compared to gains of similar magnitude. This is illustrated below.

Prospect theory

The reference point in the diagram is the current position of the individual concerned. Gains and losses are evaluated with reference to this neutral reference point. The value function takes an asymmetric S-shape because marginal value (or sensitivity) declines as absolute gains and losses increase in size. A dollar lost more than outweighs a dollar gained. In conventional economics, gains and losses are treated equally – a dollar lost simply cancels out a dollar gained. Golf provides a perfect example of a reference point: par. Every hole on a golf course has a number of strokes associated with it; the par provides the baseline for good – but not outstanding – performance. For a professional golfer, a birdie (one stroke under par) is a gain, and a bogey (one stroke over par) is a loss. Economists have compared two situations a player might face when hear the hole:

  • putt to avoid a bogey
  • putt to achieve a birdie

One group of economists analysed more than 2.5 million putts in exquisite detail to test that prediction and found that whether the putt was easy or hard, at every distance from the hole, the players were more successful when putting for par than for a birdie. The difference in their rate of success when going for par (to avoid a bogey) or for a birdie was 3.6%.

 

Rethinking Economics – Econocracy

August 2, 2017 Leave a comment

You might have come across the book ‘Econocracy’ written by students from the University of Manchester which makes three big arguments about the relevance of economics courses at Universities.

First, economics is part of all aspects of our public life. Second, the economics profession sees the economy “as a distinct system that follows a particular, often mechanical logic” and believes this “can be managed using a scientific criteria”. It would not be recognised by Keynes or Marx or Adam Smith. Thirdly, the authors criticised what economics students are being assessed on – models or theories which were being memorised for exams.

The interview below on Newsnight (BBC2) has author and student Joe Earle and Professor Diane Coyle (follow her excellent blog The Enlightened Economist) discussing the state of the discipline at University and what they don’t teach to economics students. More information can be found on the website Rethinking Economics.

The value of beliefs in economic decision-making.

July 24, 2017 Leave a comment

BE - Cognition.jpegThe economic environment is said to be determined by agents or economic decision-makers. Today, an economy is a much more intricate machine which aims to allocate scarce resources to satisfy the utility of economic agents such as individuals, firms and government. The dominant model for many years has been “Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium” (DSGE) and it takes all the characteristics of an individual (this person is typically called the representative agent) which is then cloned and taken to represent the typical person in an economy.These agents make supposedly perfect decisions by optimising, working out the kinds of mathematical problems in an instant. However the rise of behavioural economics has shown that cognitive errors are now assumptions in many aspects of economics namely – heuristics, confirmation bias, overconfidence and distorted probability weights.

According to a paper entitled “Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs” by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirol research has shown that beliefs often fulfill important psychological and functional needs of the individual. Examples include:

  • confidence in ones’ abilities,
  • moral self-esteem,
  • hope and anxiety reduction,
  • social identity,
  • political ideology
  • religious faith.

Therefore people hold beliefs because of the value they attach to them, as a result of the tradeoff between accuracy and desirability. As a consequence of this some of the beliefs do not consider prior knowledge of conditions or events that might be related to their beliefs – Bayseian Updating – this refers to people who are willing and able to modify their beliefs based on new, objective information. This non-Bayesian behaviour includes ignoring signals about their beliefs and denying what in turn will be the reality. Nevertheless motivated beliefs will respond to costs, benefits, and stakes involved in maintaining different self-views and world-views which leads to self-sustaining “social cognitions.”

Overconfidence
Bénabou and Tirol suggest that overconfidence is the most common indicator of the motivated beliefs experience. Overconfidence can be seen as quite damaging although moderate confidence can be quite useful as it often enhances an individuals ability to act successfully on their own behalf and work well with others. Research has shown that psychologically “healthy” people display some degree of overoptimism and biased updating, while it is primarily depressed subjects who seem to be more objective.

If beliefs are shared between parties they may magnify each other and there is a tendency to follow the herd, especially if information is uncertain, incomplete, and asymmetric (some people are more informed than others). Basically, in a world of bounded rationality (the limits of the human brain in processing and understanding information), herding makes sense to most people. Herding is a fast and frugal heuristic (short-cut) that has been used by both human and non-human animals across the millennia. Some behavioural economists see herding as irrational because people aren’t basing their decisions on objective criteria. If herding is seen as rational it can result in price cascades leading to excessive booms and busts in the prices of financial assets. Case and Shiller (2003) surveyed the expectations of homeowners during the real-estate bubbles of 1988 and 2003. In both cases, 90 percent of respondents thought housing prices in their city would “increase over the next several years,” with an average expected gain for their own property of 9 to 15 percent per year over the next ten years.

The strategies of self-deception and dissonance-reduction used to protect valued beliefs are many and varied, Bénabou and Tirol group them into three main types: strategic ignorance, reality denial, and self-signaling.

Strategic ignorance is when a believer avoids information offering conflicting evidence.

Reality denial refers to troubling evidence that is rationalised away: house-price bulls might conjure up fanciful theories for why prices should behave unusually, and supporters of a disgraced politician might invent conspiracies or blame fake news.

Self-signaling is when the believer creates his own tools to interpret the facts in the way he wants: an unhealthy person, for example, might decide that going for a daily run proves he is well.

Final thought

People derive utility from a sense of belonging to communities and having a positive self-image. Optimistic beliefs can also be valuable motivators to overcome self-control problems, as well as helpful in strategic interactions. In order to maintain this level of utility people tend to disregard Bayesian updating and are not willing to modify their beliefs based on new, objective information. Even if they did consider new information they will manipulate it to align with what their beliefs are.

Overconfidence is the most common indicator of the motivated beliefs experience and this can be impacted by the behaviour of others. Their confidence is often reinforced when people know that other people, including experts, and the rich and famous, are doing the same. In a world of bounded rationality, such behaviour may make sense – even though it can result in errors in decision making.

Sources:

“To err is human; so is the failure to admit it” – The Economist June 10th 2017

“Mindful Economics: The Production, Consumption, and Value of Beliefs” by Roland Bénabou and Jean Tirol. Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 30, Number 3—Summer 2016—Pages 141–16

Categories: Behavioural Economics

1980’s hyperinflation in Bolivia

June 19, 2017 Leave a comment

When you think of hyperinflation countries like post-war Germany and Zimbabwe come to mind. However Bolivia in the 1980’s seems to have been a forgotten example. Below is a very good video about the hyperinflation in Bolivia from the PBS Commanding Heights series. I use it teaching the impact of hyperinflation on an economy and policies that to try and control its impact. Some of the main issues from the video are:

  • Inflation reached 23,500%
  • 7 out of 10 Bolivians live in poverty – the poor get hurt by inflation
  • Inflation averaged 1% every 10 minutes
  • One of the causes of the inflation was government finances – they just printed money and didn’t collect taxes
  • How do you stop a hyperinflation or an inflation? Gradualist steps don’t work and as Jeff Sachs said: “All this gradualist stuff just doesn’t work. When it really gets out of control you’ve got to stop it, like in medicine. You’ve got to take some radical steps; otherwise your patient is going to die.”
  • Bolivia didn’t use highly sophisticated economic theory to deal with hyperinflation: Government spending was slashed – Price controls were scrapped – Import tariffs were cut – Government budgets were balanced. 

Inflationary Expectations

A lot of the inflationary problems in Bolivia were caused by inflationary expectations which accelerates the problem. In recent years more attention has been paid to the psychological effects which rising prices have on people’s behaviour. The various groups which make up the economy, acting in their own self-interest, will actually cause inflation to rise faster than otherwise would be the case if they believe rising prices are set to continue.

Workers, who have tended to get wage rises to ‘catch up’ with previous price increases, will attempt to gain a little extra compensate them for the expected further inflation, especially if they cannot negotiate wage increases for another year. Consumers, in belief that prices will keep rising, buy now to beat the price rises, but this extra buying adds to demand pressures on prices. In a country such as New Zealand’s before the 1990’s, with the absence of competition in many sectors of the economy, this behaviour reinforces inflationary pressures. ‘Breaking the inflationary cycle’ is an important part of permanently reducing inflation. If people believe prices will remain stable, they won’t, for example, buy land and property as a speculation to protect themselves.

 

Behavioural Economics and reclining airline seats

June 2, 2017 Leave a comment

I picked up this topic from Michael Cameron’s blog Sex, Drugs, and Economics which looked in detail at the economics behind reclining airline seats. The issue that he refers to is – who owns the space between reclining airline seats?

Externalities

The person (Recliner) who reclines their seat reduces the amount of space that the person (Reclinee) behind has especially if they have their tray table down and becomes a negative externality to them. Some airlines are worse than others with regard to space – American carriers tend to have very little room as do the low cost airlines. However carriers that operate more long haul flights especially Emirates seem to be more generous with the space between seats. However if there is nobody in the seat behind then there is no externality. This refers to the Coase Theory (see previous blog post) in which Ronald Coase stated that problems are jointly produced by the person who creates the externality and the person who is affected by it. He argued that bargaining between parties could produce a mutually beneficial and efficient solution to problems like the scares resource i.e. the space between airline seats.

An article on the site Evonomics by Buccafusco (Cardozo School of Law) and Sprigman (NYU School of Law) looked at research into how much passengers would be willing to pay to recline their seat. They looked at the following scenarios.

Default – you have the right to recline your seat
Recliners wanted on average $41 to refrain from reclining, while reclinees were willing to pay only $18 on average. Only about 21 percent of the time would ownership of the 4 inches change hands

Default – you don’t have the right to recline your seat and have to negotiate
Recliners were only willing to pay about $12 to recline while reclinees were unwilling to sell their knee room for less than $39. Recliners would have ended up purchasing the right to recline only about 28 percent of the time—the same right that they valued so highly in the other condition.

The Coase theorem suggests that the initial allocation of rights should not matter, because if the person who values the right the most doesn’t start out with it, they will simply purchase it from the other. But what Buccafusco and Sprigman found suggests that this simple solution might not work. What they found was an endowment effect.

Loss Aversion and the  Endowment Effect

Loss aversion can be explained by prospect theory, which states that an individual’s value function (whether for money or otherwise) is concave for gains but convex for losses. In other words, people are more sensitive to losses compared to gains of similar magnitude. This is illustrated below.

Prospect theory

The reference point in the diagram is the current position of the individual concerned. Gains and losses are evaluated with reference to this neutral reference point. The value function takes an asymmetric S-shape because marginal value (or sensitivity) declines as absolute gains and losses increase in size. A dollar lost more than outweighs a dollar gained. In conventional economics, gains and losses are treated equally – a dollar lost simply cancels out a dollar gained. Golf provides a perfect example of a reference point: par. Every hole on a golf course has a number of strokes associated with it; the par provides the baseline for good – but not outstanding – performance. For a professional golfer, a birdie (one stroke under par) is a gain, and a bogey (one stroke over par) is a loss. Economists have compared two situations a player might face when hear the hole:

  • putt to avoid a bogey
  • putt to achieve a birdie

One group of economists analysed more than 2.5 million putts in exquisite detail to test that prediction and found that whether the putt was easy or hard, at every distance from the hole, the players were more successful when putting for par than for a birdie. The difference in their rate of success when going for par (to avoid a bogey) or for a birdie was 3.6%.

Note that endowment effects are working for the ‘reclinees’ as well – they are willing to give up their extra knee room for $39 if they had the right to keep it, but would only be willing to pay $18 to get that right if they didn’t start out with it.

The endowment effect means that this problem isn’t really amenable to a simple solution, because recliners already have the default rights, and are understandably unwilling to give those rights up. And any change in policy is going to incur passenger protest – because even though we may gain knee room, passengers would be giving up their right to recline, and loss aversion almost ensures that would be a painful and unwelcome trade-off for most passengers.

J.Cole and the Hedonic Treadmill

May 15, 2017 Leave a comment

Below is a very good video from rapper J.Cole in which he talks about the insatiable demand for material things and how it will never make people happy.

Affluent youth in the USA have rates of depression and anxiety which is more than twice the national average. Wealth has been linked to high rates of depression, anxiety, psychosomatic issues and self-mutilation. It seems that the very wealthy have the same problems as the rest of us but only on a much larger scale. A research paper from Boston College entitled “Secret fears of the super-Rich found that the top fears of the rich are:

  1. The rich need increasing amounts of money to make them feel financially secure.
  2. They feel isolated and don’t share their concerns or stress as they will sound ungrateful.
  3. Thy worry that their children will become spoilt by inheriting so much wealth or resentful if its too little.
  4. You are unsure if your friends genuinely like you or your money
  5. There is constant dissatisfaction with consumption as something better / new is always being launched. They can’t get off the hedonic treadmill
  6. Parents are concerned that money will rob their children of ambition and getting a job.

“ONE OF THE SADDEST PHRASES I’ve heard,” Kenny says of his time counseling the wealthy, is when the heir to a fortune is told, “‘Honey, you’re never going to have to work.’” The announcement is often made, Kenny explains, by a rich grandparent to a grandchild—and it rarely sounds as good to the recipient as to the one delivering it. Work is what fills most people’s days, and it provides the context in which they interact with others. A life of worklessness, however financially comfortable, can easily become one of aimlessness, of estrangement from the world. The fact that most people imagine it would be paradise to never have to work does not make the experience any more pleasant in practice.

The Atlantic 

 

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