The Headwinds and the economic system

I came across this graphic by Bruce Mehlman in ‘Thoughts from the frontline’ from Mauldin Economics. It looks at the change that was already evident before COVID-19 and the war in the Ukraine but have accelerated because of these events. The tailwinds for 30 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall are starting to slow/stop and it seems that there are now headwinds rising and reversing the process. The trust element in the global economy is probably at all time low and survey data between 1979 and 2021 saw that the military gain trust. All others—media, religion, courts, schools, labor, business, Congress—lost much and sometimes most of their credibility since then.

However in times crisis humanity can usually conjure up accelerating innovation and change: faster productivity, entrepreneurship, smarter healthcare, and a transition to next-generation energy sources.

Business cycle or volatile booms and busts? The four stages of the bubble.

I blogged on this topic last year but below is a useful video from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) on how bubbles are so difficult to predict with some examples from Gamestop to Tulips. A graphical explanation follows after the video.

I picked up this graphic and explanation from The Geography of Transport Systems by Jean-Paul Rodrigue (2020)

It is apparent that business cycles aren’t those smooth ups and downs as depicted in a lot of textbooks but more volatile with booms and busts. Central banks appear to play their part in this process with the low cost of borrowing feeding the boom phase of the cycle. Instead of economic stability regulated by market forces, monetary intervention creates long-term instability for the sake of short-term stability.

Bubbles (financial manias) unfold in several stages, an observation that is backed up by 500 years of economic history. Each mania is obviously different, but there are always similarities; simplistically, four phases can be identified:

  • Stealth – emerging opportunity for future prize appreciations of investments. Investors have better access to information and understand the wider economic context that would trigger asset inflation. Prices tend to increase but are unnoticed by the general public.
  • Awareness – many investors start to notice the momentum so money starts to push prices higher. There can be sell-offs but the smart money takes this opportunity to reinforce its existing positions. The media start to notice that this boom benefits the economy.
  • Mania – the public see prices going up and see this a great opportunity to invest with the expectations about future appreciation. This stage is not so much about reasoning but psychology as money pours into the market creating greater expectations and pushing prices up. Unbiased opinion about the fundamentals becomes increasingly difficult to find as many players are heavily invested and have every interest to keep asset inflation going. At some point, statements are made about entirely new fundamentals implying that a “permanent high plateau” has been reached to justify future price increases; the bubble is about to collapse.
  • Blow-off – everyone roughly at the same time realises that the situation has changed. Confidence and expectations encounter a paradigm shift, not without a phase of denial where many try to reassure the public that this is just a temporary setback. Many try to unload their assets, but takers are few; everyone is expecting further price declines. Prices plummet at a rate much faster than the one that inflated the bubble. Many over-leveraged asset owners go bankrupt, triggering additional waves of sales. This is the time when the smart money starts acquiring assets at low prices.

For more on the Business Cycle view the key notes (accompanied by fully coloured diagrams/models) on elearneconomics that will assist students to understand concepts and terms for external examinations, assignments or topic tests.

Quantity Theory of Money – you can’t have your cake and eat it

I blogged on this topic last year but I thought it appropriate to look at it again especially I have just completed it with my NCEA Level 2 class and about to start the topic next week with my CIE A2 class. – it refers to Unit 4 of the CIE A2 Economics course and the Inflation topic at NCEA Level 2. Velocity of circulation of money is part of the the Monetarist explanation of inflation operates through the Fisher equation:

M x V = P x T

M = Stock of money
V = Income Velocity of Circulation
P = Average Price level
T = Volume of Transactions or Output

For example if M=100 V=5 P=2 T=250.   Therefore MV=PT – 100×5 = 2×250
Both M x V and P x T are equivalent to TOTAL EXPENDITURE or NOMINAL INCOME in a given time period. To turn the equation into a theory, monetarists assume that V and T are constant, not being affected by changes in the money supply, so that a change
in the money supply causes an equal percentage change in the price level.

The speed at with which money goes around the circular flow is a significant indicator as to the economic activity of an economy. Money’s “velocity” is calculated by dividing a country’s quarterly GDP by its money stock that quarter – the bigger GDP is relative to the money supply, the higher the velocity.

Recessions – dampen the velocity by increasing the attractive of a store of value. People tend to save rather than spend. E.G. The Great Depression and the GFC. See graph for US velocity of money.

Covid-19 – with the closure of a lot of businesses and people worried about job security personal savings increased to 33.6% of disposable income. Also consumers didn’t have the money to spend.

The stimulus measures and the glut of dollars could cause problems once the consumer confidence starts to become prevalent. Inflation will inevitably rise again – which is not a bad thing considering the threat of deflation that we are currently experiencing. But the major concern is if the increase in spending spirals out of control with high inflation. It seems that central banks want the velocity of money to increase to kick-start the economy but they will need to consider how to control it if it gets above the ‘speed limit’. “You can’t have your cake and eat it”.

The concern now is that inflation is at very high levels around the world caused by both supply and demand issues. Velocity of circulation is increasing but also major supply chain problems and still expansionary monetary conditions – low interest rates – are contributing to higher prioces.

The table shows the global problem of inflation. The OECD area climbed to 7.2 percent in January 2022 – the highest level in the area since February 1991. In the US inflation has risen to 7.5% – main cause being petrol up 40% and cars/truck up 40.5%. In New Zealand the CPI is 5.9% above the 1-3% target range. The outlier is Japan who has had deflationary concerns for a number of years.

Source: Why money is changing hands much less frequently – The Economist 21-11-20

Sign up to elearneconomics for multiple choice test questions (many with coloured diagrams and models) and the reasoned answers on Quantity Theory of Money Immediate feedback and tracked results allow students to identify areas of strength and weakness vital for student-centred learning and understanding.

V U Z W L recoveries and the inverted square root

Usually we talk about U V W or L recoveries but with the impact of Covid-19 there has been much mention of an inverted square root (as mentioned by George Soros in video below) in some countries as an economy tries to gain some semblance of pre-covid normality. Below is an image from the Wall Street Journal that describes each of the following recoveries: – V U Swoosh Z W L.

Probably the inverted square root sign illustrates the most likely scenario today, with some recovery of the lost GDP but not a return to the previous trajectory. This represents a surge in demand after the relaxing of restrictions but it doesn’t last and starts to plateau after a period of time. For a lot of countries a second wave of Covid-19 has meant a return to lockdown and a further dampening of demand with the economy unable to compensate for people in bars / restaurants / sports events etc. Furthermore the fear of physical proximity will keep the recovery of services subdued.

Although from 2011 the video below from the PBS Newshour shows reporter Paul Solman and Simon Johnson – former IMF economist and now at MIT. Johnson explains the different types of recoveries – L U V W shapes. Note George Soros and the inverted square root sign.

New Zealand savings and COVID-19

Not surprisingly New Zealand’s household saving increased in the last year with COVID-19 and lockdown. Household savings is calculated as the difference between household net disposable income and household consumption spending. Net disposable income is the amount of money that households have to spend on goods and services after tax (it includes benefit and welfare income).

The 2020 June quarter showed the highest level of having with almost $7 billion being saved – savings ration of 14.7%. Interesting to see that after the lockdown consumers made up for the lack of previous spending with the lowest saving ratio in two years – 0.4%.

According to Stats NZ, the increase in household income was due to a rise in the compensation of employees (wages and salaries) and the incomes of self-employed business owners. The increase in spending was mainly on accommodation, restaurant and cultural services, and durable goods (such as whiteware)

Source: NZ Parliamentary Economic Research Report – August 2021

The Supercycle and MMT

I listened to a very good interview on the David McWilliams podcast in which he talks with Dario Perkins the super cycle and the end of neoliberalism. A lot of the discussion was around the paper that Dario Perkins had written – A New Supercycle Running on MMT – in which he sees MMT as delivering a superior fiscal-monetary mix.
The fact that fiscal policy must take over from monetary policy has been the apparent with the range of policies that were implemented after the GFC. Since the late-19th century the super cycle can be placed into three phases of Capitalism influenced by macro-financial-political regimes – see chart below. MMT could provide the intellectual rationale for a new form of capitalism – Capitalism 4.0. Over the last century the pendulum has swung between extreme fiscal and extreme monetary policy with the global economy primed for another change.

1920’s – Monetary policy dominated but ineffective during the Great Depression
1930’s – Fiscal policy dominated as there was a need for government intervention to get the economy moving after the Great Depression
1940’s – 1960’s – Fiscal Policy – with the 2nd World War and the recovery process post-war.
1970’s – Stagflation and fiscal policy is no longer effective and Keynesian economics as government spending just causes higher inflation and higher unemployment.
1980’s – Monetary policy gains traction and inflation is brought under control. Central Banks become independent and fiscal policy and government intervention is seen as a restriction to growth. With Reagan and Thatcher Neoliberalism was the ideology of the day

Source: A New Supercycle Running on MMT

Have we reached a new regime – Capitalism 4.0?
The GFC was a warning that capitalism in its present form was not working and there was potential for a new regime change. However governments adopted austerity and QE which made inequality worse. The issue was that there was no alternative to the neoliberalism Capitalism 3.0 but with the arrival of COVID-19 governments have been forced to spend up large and there is a belief that the old system doesn’t work and that maintaining Capitalism 3.0 will not make the situation any better. Stephanie Kelton, author of The Deficit Myth, argues that we need to rethink our attitudes towards government spending.

Modern Monetary Theory (MMT)
MMT states that a government that can create its own money therefore:Cannot default on debt denominated in its own currency;

  • Can pay for goods, services, and financial assets without a need to collect money in the form of taxes or debt issuance in advance of such purchases;
  • Is limited in its money creation and purchases by inflation, which accelerates once the economic resources (i.e., labor and capital) of the economy are utilised at full employment;
  • Can control inflation by taxation and bond issuance, which remove excess money from circulation, although the political will to do so may not always exist;
  • Does not need to compete with the private sector for scarce savings by issuing bonds.
  • Within this model the only constraint on spending is inflation, which can break out if the public and private sectors spend too much at the same time. As long as there are enough workers and equipment to meet growing demand without igniting inflation, the government can spend what it needs to maintain employment and achieve goals such as halting climate change.

It will be interesting to see if MMT can enjoy the same presence in economic policy that monetarism and Milton Friedman experienced in the post-stagflation time period. Back then there was a political revolution primed to embrace monetarism and neoliberal ideas and an electorate that had experienced a serious economic crisis – stagflation. Subsequently the influence of MMT will come down to politics.

Joe Biden seems to have embarked on a more radical macro-economic policy which has various instruments that are found in MMT. Will there be other political leaders who embrace this paradigm like Reagan and Thatcher in the 1980’s with Friedman and monetarism?

Source: A New Supercycle Running on MMT

Global GDP levels June 2019 – December 2020

A recent publication from the ANZ looked at the GDP in a range of economies. Useful for discussion in class if you are doing GDP and business cycles.

Note:

  • China has rebounded well
  • UK and Euro area had the more severe downturns
  • New Zealand has the steepest rebound from a lockdown period
  • Interesting to note that the bottom of the downturn in all countries is in June 2020 with the exception of China.

Global GDP levels (Q4 2019= 100)

Source: New Zealand Weekly Data – 19th March 2021.

The Ancient Art of Economic Forecasting – 2019 Coronavirus?

I came across this piece from a colleague on economic forecasting. The article below appeared in the Sydney Metropolitan Press in the late 1920’s. Although economic cycles don’t run to an exact time period the graph below would indicate that this model is not too far out of kilter.

  • The top line = years in which panics have occurred and will happen again
  • The middle line = years of good times, high prices and the time to sell stocks
  • The bottom line = years of hard times, low prices and good times to buy stocks

The past panic century of dates are 1911, 1927, 1945, 1965, 1981, 1999, 2019. Except for 1981, these were all pretty good years to sell stocks – The Big Picture blog. 2016 suggests the top of the present cycle with 2019 being a year of panic.

“The Ancient Art of Economic Forecasting” – Sydney Metropolitan Press 1920’s

The graph below professes to forecast the future trend of Australian business conditions, was first brought under the notice of the public in 1872. It was prepared by a Mr Tritch, whose origin and activities are shrouded in mystery.

  • The top line shows years in which panics have occurred, and will occur again. Their cycles are 16, 18 and 20 years.
  • The centre line shows the years of good times and high prices; the cycles are 8, 9 and 10 years.
  • The bottom line shows the years of depressions and low prices; the cycles are 9, 7 and 11 years.

The panic which occurred in 1893 is shown in 1891. Nevertheless, that year witnessed the beginning of the depression. 1915, just after the war started was a year of depreciation, and 1919, the year following the cessation of hostilities, was a period charcterised by good times.

As this chart was published in 1872, it is interesting to note the forecast of the panic in 2019 – coronavirus? It will be seen that there has been a general upward trend since 1926 with the panic occurring in 1927 after the high is reached. The bottom of the depression is reached at the end of 1930 and the upward trend begins in 1931.”

Japanification – how to cope with low interest rates.

Economists use the term Japanification as shorthand for the situation where economic growth remains stagnant even with significant monetary easing – lower interest rates and increased government spending. With interest rates already at record low levels it seems that a lot of economies are going the same way as Japan. However as discussed in the video below from the FT, Japan is a nice place to live and has a very high life expectancy. The concern for central banks is what other policy instruments do they have after really low interest rates – they are running out of ammunition. To boost growth in the USA is a lot different than in Japan according to Ben Friedman. He states that Japan does not have the problems of widening inequality and the stagnation of the middle income groups.

The question is why Japanese society seems to cope with an economy that doesn’t respond to very low interest rates and increase government spending? The FT look to Robert Pringle’s book ‘The Power of Money’ and suggest three reasons:

  • Long established business – 5500-odd companies that are 200+ years old, more than 3,000 are Japanese. They are much more resilient to change and have less of a focus on short-term profits but too service, patience and a disdain for pecuniary motives.
  • Immaterialism – unlike a lot of western countries (US in particular) money in Japan is less significant in showing success. Therefore there is less social conflict.
  • Japanese version of capitalism – US = individualism and democracy. Japan = individual is part of a group and discourage competition = a stable society.

Source: How Japan has coped with Japanification

UK Economy – Goldilocks and the output gap

Chris Giles of The FT wrote a very good article explaining the output gap using Goldilocks and the three bears. As you may know in the story Goldilocks found the first bowl of porridge too hot, the second bowl too cold but the third bowl just right. We can use this analogy with regard to the economy:

  • running too hot – a positive output gap – the economy is overheating and higher interest rates and less government spending is needed to slow the economy down.
  • running too cold – a negative output gap – the economy has a lot of spare capacity and needs to be stimulated by dropping interest rates and increasing government spending.
  • running just right – no gap – there is neither a requirement for an expansionary monetary and fiscal policy nor a contractionary monetary and fiscal policy.

Just as Messrs Friedman and Phelps had predicted, the level of inflation associated with a given level of unemployment rose through the 1970s, and policymakers had to abandon the Phillips curve. Today there is a broad consensus that monetary policy should focus on holding down inflation. But this does not mean, as is often claimed, that central banks are “inflation nutters”, cruelly indifferent towards unemployment.

If there is no long-term trade-off, low inflation does not permanently choke growth. Moreover, by keeping inflation low and stable, a central bank, in effect, stabilises output and jobs. In the graph below the straight line represents the growth in output that the economy can sustain over the long run; the wavy line represents actual output. When the economy is producing below potential (ie, unemployment is above the NAIRU), at point A, inflation will fall until the “output gap” is eliminated. When output is above potential, at point B, inflation will rise for as long as demand is above capacity. If inflation is falling (point A), then a central bank will cut interest rates, helping to boost growth in output and jobs; when inflation is rising (point B), it will raise interest rates, dampening down growth. Thus if monetary policy focuses on keeping inflation low and stable, it will automatically help to stabilise employment and growth.

Gapology

 

However policymakers rely on estimates of the output gap – which compares actual GDP with a country’s full capacity when all resources are fully employed. The concern that the Bank of England have is that official data shows that the UK economy is showing sluggish growth rates with a tight labour market.

Almost all employment indicators suggest the economy close to overheating – recruitment difficulties and industry facing capacity constraints. This is in contrast to economic growth which suggest that there is room for expansion. Add to this the uncertainty about Brexit, the reliability of the output gap even more dubious. Current techniques might correctly measure the output gap but what about the contribution of potential capital projects which are underway?

Some economists have suggested that output gaps are inherently political and chosen to rationalise existing policies, rather than to set the correct prescriptions. However for economists is there an alternative to taking the temperature of an economy.

Economic Consequences of Trump

Very good video from Project Syndicate looking at the recovery of the US economy and if it is sustainable. Also was Trump responsible for the growth or Obama? Maybe Janet Yellen and central bankers with such low interest rates for a long period of time. However if there is another downturn do governments have the tools to grow the economy again? It seems that central banks have run out of ammunition i.e. no room to cut interest rates further. There is agreement that the levels of employment are not sustainable in the future and the focus should be on assisting low wage work and help people prepare for and keep work- ‘reward work’.

  • Features Nobel laureates Angus Deaton and Edmund Phelps, along with Barry Eichengreen,
  • Rana Foroohar author of ‘Makers and Takers’
  • Glenn Hubbard Dean of Columbia Business School

Central Banks could cause next financial crisis

A Buttonwood piece in the Economist (30th September 2017) looked at how central banks can trigger the next financial crisis. Deutsche Bank have looked into long-term asset returns in developed markets and suggest that crises have become much more common. They define a crisis when a country suffered one of the following:

  • a 15% annual decline in equities;
  • a 10% fall in its currency or its government bonds;
  • a default on its national debt; or
  • a period of double-digit inflation.

Pre the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and a central bank’s limited ability to create credit, very few countries suffered a shock in a single year. But since 1980 there have been numerous financial crisis of some kind. Under the Bretton Woods system a country that expanded its money supply too quickly would encourage an increased demand for imports which would ultimately lead to a trade deficit and pressure on its exchange rate; the government would react by slamming on the monetary brakes. The result was that it was harder for financial bubbles to inflate.

But with a floating exchange rate a country has more flexibility to deal with economic crisis as they don not have to maintain a currency that is pegged to another. A weaker currency makes exports more competitive and imports more expensive. But it has also created a trend towards greater trade imbalances, which no longer constrain policymakers—the currency is often allowed to take the strain. See flow chart below.

As well as companies and consumers taking on debt, government debt has also been rising as a proportion of GDP since the mid-1970’s:

  • Japan – a deficit every year since 1966
  • France – a deficit every year since 1993
  • Italy – only one year of surplus since 1950

This has resulted in significant credit expansion and collapse – by allowing consumers to borrow more money the cost of assets (esp. houses) is pushed higher. However when lenders lose confidence in borrowers ability to repay they stop lending and mortgage sales follow. This is then reflected in the credit rating of borrowers. In order to try and rectify the problem the central banks intervene and reduce interest rates or buy assets directly. This may bring the crisis to a temporary halt but results in more debt and higher asset prices.

Deutsche Bank suggest that could mean another financial crisis especially if there is the withdrawal of support from central banks who saved the global economy when the GFC started. Indicators suggest that this may be the case:

  • US Fed – has pushed up interest rates and cut back on asset purchases
  • ECB – likely to cut asset purchases next year
  • Bank of England – has recently pushed up interest rates

However rates are still at a stimulatory level and developed economies have been growing for several years. According to Deutsche Bank any kind of return to “normal” asset prices from their high levels would constitute a crisis. This would then force central banks to once again lower interest rates again but they will not want to appear to be the ambulance at the bottom of the cliff every time this happens. Remember the bailouts of AIG and the investment banks. It seems that the investment banks are happy to privatize the reward but socialise the risk – when it all “turns to custard” they need to be bailed because they are too big to fail. The question that people are now asking is what is the vulnerable asset class? Mortgage-backed securities was the cause in 2008.

IMF World Evaluation from the FT

Below is a very good video put together by the FT which summarises the recent IMF Report on the World Economy. Includes:

  • Better growth in China and the Euro zone makes up for slow US growth.
  • US infrastructure spending and tax reform still has to be approved by the senate.
  • Europe looking stronger than expected.
  • Emerging economies still face tough conditions.

The Ancient Art of Economic Forecasting

I came across this piece from a colleague on economic forecasting. The article below appeared in the Sydney Metropolitan Press in the late 1920’s. Although economic cycles don’t run to an exact time period the graph below would indicate that this model is not too far out of kilter.

The top line = years in which panics have occurred and will happen again

The middle line = years of good times, high prices and the time to sell stocks

The bottom line = years of hard times, low prices and good times to buy stocks

The past panic century of dates are 1911, 1927, 1945, 1965, 1981, 1999, 2019. Except for 1981, these were all pretty good years to sell stocks – The Big Picture blog. 2016 suggests the top of the present cycle with 2019 being a year of panic.

“The Ancient Art of Economic Forecasting” – Sydney Metropolitan Press 1920’s

The attached graph professes to forecast the future trend of Australian business conditions, was first brought under the notice of the public in 1872. It was prepared by a Mr Tritch, whose origin and activities are shrouded in mystery.

The top line shows years in which panics have occured, and will occur again. Their cycles are 16, 18 and 20 years. The centre line shows the years of good times and high prices; the cycles are 8, 9 and 10 years. The bottom line shows the years of depressions and low prices; the cycles are 9, 7 and 11 years.

The panic which occurred in 1893 is shown in 1891. Nevertheless, that year witnessed the beginning of the depression. 1915, just after the war started was a year of depreciation, and 1919, the year following the cessation of hostilities, was a period charcterised by good times.

As this chart was published in 1872, it is interesting to note the forecast of the depression now existing. It will be seen that there has been a general upward trend since 1926 with the panic occuring in 1927 after the high is reached. The bottom of the depression is reached at the end of 1930 and the upward trend begins in 1931.”

Art of forecasting2.png

Housing bubble and zero sum game

There has been a lot of talk in the media about an Auckland housing bubble and its impact on the New Zealand economy.  Below is a very informative graph I got from http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk which looks at the anatomy of a bubble.

Anatomy of bubble

Zero-Sum Game

When house prices are increasing rapidly we tend to feel better off but also have increased mortgage debt. House price inflation is a zero-sum game in that society as a whole does not benefit from a rise in house prices as those on the property ladder can only gain at the expense of prospective homeowners that cannot afford to enter the market. Over a short period of time house price inflation can provide a boost to economic growth if they deceive people into believing they are wealthier.

Positive-Sum Game

However, when a business invests it tends to have a positive-sum game in that if it employs 50 more workers that doesn’t mean that there are 50 other workers in the economy that are going to lose their jobs. This is real GDP growth rather than investing in property which tends not to generate growth as it is a finished asset – however some will argue that maintenance will always be needed.

Macro Conflicts in New Zealand

Part of the Cambridge A2 syllabus studies Macro Economic conflicts of Policy Objectives. Here I am looking at GDP, Unemployment, and Inflation (improving Trade figures is another objective also). The objectives are:

* Stable low inflation with prices rising within the target range of 1% – 3% per year
* Sustainable growth – as measured by the rate of growth of real gross domestic product
* Low unemployment – the government wants to achieve full-employment

New Zealand Growth, Jobs and Prices — 3 Key Macro Objectives Inflation, jobs and growth

1. Inflation and unemployment:

From the graph above you can see that low levels of unemployment have created higher prices – demand-pull inflation. Also note that as unemployment has increased there is a short-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation. Notice the increase in inflation in 2010-2011 as this is when the rate of GST was increased from 12.5% to 15%. Also today we have falling inflation (0.4% below the 1-3% band set by the RBNZ) and unemployment is on the rise – approximately 6%

NZ Economy 2006-2015

2. Economic growth and inflation

With increasing growth levels prices started to increase in 2007 going above the 3% threshold in 2008. This suggests that there were capacity issues in the economy and the aggregate supply curve was becoming very inelastic. In subsequent years the level of growth has dropped and with it the inflation rate.

3. Economic Growth and Unemployment

With increasing levels of GDP growth unemployment figures have tended to gravitate downward. This was apparent between 2006-2008 – GDP was positive and unemployment did fall to approximately 3.6%. From 2009 onwards you can see that growth has been positive with unemployment falling. 2015 saw the unemployment rate rising with lower annual growth rate.

Smoothing out the boom bust cycles

Below is a very informative video from the Reserve Bank of New Zealand about smoothing out the boom bust cycles in the New Zealand economy. There are some notes that follow which have been edited from the transcript.

Objectives macro prudential policy.

  • To build resilience of the financial system so that it can cope with the business cycle if it turns from boom to bust.
  • To be proactive in dampening the risk to begin with. This could include dampen the growth of credit, house prices or other asset prices. An example of this was in New Zealand in the late 1980’s – share market crash and the plunge in commercial property prices.

Macro Prudential Tool Kit – 4 Tools

1. Counter-cyclical capital buffer

This is where the banks are required to hold an extra margin of capital during the boom part of the cycle so that if the boom turns to bust the banks have an extra margin of capital that they can then call on to meet loan losses.

2. Sectorial capital overlay

This is very similar to a counter-cyclical capital buffer but it is about holding extra capital against a particular sector that the banks might be leaning to, for example the household sector, the farming sector, or potentially the commercial property sector.

3. Loan to value ratio for residential housing lending

This is a limit on the amount of high loan to value ratio lending or low deposit lending that the banks are able to do for the household sector. High LVR lending potentially fuels rapid house price growth and so that might be another reason why you would use that particular instrument.

4. Core funding ratio

This is a tool that has been a permanent fixture for the banks. There are a number of reasons why the core funding ratio might change. Potentially if the banks are facing an increase in risk, the Reserve Bank could require them to hold more core funding, funding that would be more likely to remain in the system during a downturn. By holding more of that stable funding, they’d be less likely to stop lending in a downturn because the funding would remain in the system.

Boom bust cycles are cycles in the economy and in the financial system are of course a fact of life. Macro-prudential policy certainly won’t prevent those cycles from occurring. What it will do is provide some cushioning to the cycle. It will hopefully clip the highs and the lows to some extent so that the flow of credit and the flow of financial services in the economy continue through time. It’s not about preventing the cycle or dampening it completely. It’s about taking some of the extremes out of the cycle.

Paul Mason interview on Radio New Zealand – “Pay People to Exist”

Post Cap MasonYesterday on Radio New Zealand Kim Hill interviewed Paul Mason – Channel 4 economics correspondent – about his new book entitled PostCapitalism: A Guide to Our Future. The book gives a very radical and innovative view of history, and offers a vision of a post capitalist society.

Mason believes that after two centuries in which capitalism has dominated the western world, this economic system has become desperately dysfunctional: inequality is growing, climate change is accelerating and nations are beset with bad demographics, debt burdens and angry voters. He makes three assertions according to Gillian Tett of the Financial Times:

  1. “information technology has reduced the need for work” — or, more accurately, for all humans to be workers.For automation is now replacing jobs at a startling speed
  2. “information goods are corroding the market’s ability to form prices correctly”. For the key point about cyber-information is that it can be replicated endlessly, for free; there is no constraint on how many times we can copy and paste a Wikipedia page. “Until we had shareable information goods, the basic law of economics was that everything is scarce. Supply and demand assumes scarcity. Now certain goods are not scarce, they are abundant.”
  3. “goods, services and organisations are appearing that no longer respond to the dictates of the market and the managerial hierarchy”. More specifically, people are collaborating in a manner that does not always make sense to traditional economists, who are used to assuming that humans act in self-interest and price things according to supply and demand.

Radio NZHe also makes the point that we are going to live through a long transition from capitalism – the state and the market to post capitalism which is the state, the market and the shared collaborative economy. With technology taking a lot of the jobs in traditional industries in the UK he states that further development in this sector is not the way of creating new jobs. He talks about delinking work from wages by just paying people to actually exist – rather than tax to exist. He does come up with some very interesting thoughts and it is well worth listening to. Click below to hear the interview:

Paul Mason interview on Radio New Zealand

10 reasons why not to be so concerned about China’s stockmarket plunge.

Last month the drop in the Chinese stockmarket – Shanghai Composite – sent alarm bells ringing around the world economy that the world’s second largest economy was in trouble. A recent Economist article (‘Taking a Tumble’ – August 29th 2015) suggest that all is not lost for the Chinese economy and the developed world should not be agitated. Several arguments were made to ease the concern of the West:

1. The Shanghai Composite in relation to the over all size of the Chinese economy is very small – 33% of GDP compared with over 100% in developed economies.
2. Stocks and the economic fundamentals are not strongly correlated – share prices increased 30% last year but this data didn’t reflect improved Chinese growth forecasts.
3. Less than 20% of Chinese household wealth is invested in shares.
4. The money borrowed by consumers to invest in the sharemarket amounts to just 1% of total banking assets – not significant.
5. For the Chinese economy the property market matters more than stocks and shares do. Housing and land account for the vast majority of collateral.
6. The service sector now accounts for a bigger share of national output than industry.
7. With regard to the fiscal position of the Chinese government things are looking quite positive. It aimed for a budget deficit of 2.3% of GDP this year, but as of July it was still in surplus, having raised more in taxes than it had spent. Therefore it has the ammunition if required to stimulate more growth.
China I and C8. The economy is rebalancing, albeit slowly, away from investment and towards consumption (see chart 3). China still has many more homes, highways and airports to build, but the trend away from them is unmistakable.
9. Economic growth is almost certainly lower than the rate reported by the government but it appears to be in the range of a soft landing.
10. The People’s Bank of China (central bank) still have room to cut rates – benchmark one-year lending rates are at 4.6%. Furthermore the required reserve ratios are at 18% for trading banks. The central bank has room to cut both rates whilst most developed countries don’t have that luxury.

Bad news for China’s trading partners

As a result, China’s appetite for commodities has probably peaked. That is bad news for companies and countries that prospered over the past decade by selling it mountains of iron ore, copper and coal – e.g. our cousins across the ditch in Australia. A decline in Chinese consumption would be of huge consequence: it absorbs about half the world’s aluminium, nickel and steel, and nearly a third of its cotton and rice.

The countries most exposed to shifts in China’s economy, meanwhile, are the commodity exporters who supply the raw materials for the steel girders and copper piping that have underpinned the construction boom.

Final thought
The plunge in the Chinese stockmarket was not evidence that the economy is on the edge. However, there are those that now doubt China as having such a safe economy.