Home > Behavioural Economics, Euro > Greek Crisis – A game of chicken

Greek Crisis – A game of chicken

Chicken gameThe negotiations between Greece and the Eurozone financial chiefs represent a typical game of ‘Chicken’. Chicken readily translates into an abstract game. Strictly speaking game theory’s chicken dilemma occurs at the last possible moment of a game of highway chicken. Each driver has calculated his reaction time and his car’s turning radius, which is assumed to be the same in both cars. There comes a time when each driver must decide to either swerve or keep going straight towards the other car. This decision is irrevocable and must be made in ignorance of the other driver’s decision. There is no time for one driver’s last-minute decision to influence the other driver’s decision. In its simulations, life or death simplicity, chicken is one of the purest examples of John von Neumann’s concept of a game. The way players rank outcomes in highway chicken is obvious. The worst scenario is for both players not to swerve – they crash and both are killed. The best thing that can happen is for you to keep driving straight letting the other driver swerving. The cooperative outcome is not so bad as both drivers are still alive although no one can call the other chicken.

As in the game of Chicken, both Greece and the Eurozone have the option to make concessions (Swerve) or hold firm in negotiations (Drive Straight). As with most negotiations, the best outcome for a party is to stand their ground while the other party makes the concessions. However, as both parties want this outcome, this raises the possibility of both sides holding firm and no settlement being reached. In the Greek-Eurozone crisis, this would mean a Greek default and the associated consequences that would ensue for the rest of the Eurozone.

Fortunately there is a third outcome that can prevail in Chicken – both parties can swerve their car at the same time. If both sides are willing to make concessions, then the second best outcome in this game can be attained for everyone. This co-operative outcome could be reached if the Eurozone extended further concessions to Greece, while Greece made binding promises to implement meaningful reforms to get their economy back on track.

However this is unlikely as each player achieves their best outcome by doing the opposite of their opponent. For example, if Greece believes the Eurozone will make concessions, it will achieve the best outcome by standing firm; if it believes the Eurozone will stand firm in negotiations, it’s best option is to make concessions to avoid the dire consequences of a full-blown default.

Chicken - Greece Germany

From the beginning of June until the end of December Greece needs to find another EUR28bn in total. After that point repayments drop off – one reason why Greece’s creditors are keen to ensure new reforms are enacted ASAP.
The inference however is clear: Greece won’t make it that far without a new deal. Greece is waiting on further funding from the IMF and the ECB (EUR 7.2bn) in order to meet some of these payments, but with both sides digging in, it isn’t a given that Greece will receive the funds. See graph below.

Greece repayments

Sources: NAB Australian Markets Weekly, Christoph Schumacher Massey University, Open Economy – Open minded Economics, Prisoner’s Dilemma – William Poundstone

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